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Can lies be detected unconsciously?
Wen Ying Moi and David R. Shanks*
Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, London, UK
People are typically poor at telling apart truthful and deceptive statements. Based on
the Unconscious Thought Theory, it has been suggested that poor lie detection arises
from the intrinsic limitations of conscious thinking and can be improved by facilitating the
contribution of unconscious thought (UT). In support of this hypothesis, Reinhard et al.
(2013) observed improved lie detection among participants engaging in UT. The present
study aimed to replicate this UT advantage using a similar experimental procedure
but with an important improvement in a key control condition. Specifically, participants
judged the truthfulness of eight video recordings in three thinking modes: immediately
after watching them or after a period of unconscious or conscious deliberation. Results
from two experiments (combined N = 226) failed to reveal a significant difference in
lie detection accuracy between the thinking modes, even after efforts were made to
facilitate the occurrence of an UT advantage in Experiment 2. The results imply that the
UT advantage in deception detection is not a robust phenomenon.
Keywords: lie detection, deliberation-without-attention, unconscious thought, decision making
Introduction
Humans regularly encounter and generate deception in their everyday social interactions, even
though the act of lying is perceived as morally wrong by a society that values trustworthiness.
To place the ubiquity of this phenomenon in perspective, DePaulo et al. (1996) conducted an
experiment where college students and community members recorded all their social interactions
and all of the lies they told during those interactions every day for a week. A lie was said to occur
whenever participants intentionally tried to mislead another individual. By the end of the week, all
participants recorded a total of 1,535 lies. For college students, this amounted to two lies per day
or one lie in every three social interactions. For community members, this meant one lie per day or
one lie in every ﬁve social interactions. These ﬁndings led DePaulo et al. (1996, p. 991) to conclude
that “lying is a fact of daily life.” Results from other studies investigating the frequency of deception
occurrences (e.g., DePaulo and Kashy, 1998; Weiss and Feldman, 2006) also lend credibility to such
a conclusion.
In spite of the pervasiveness of deception, humans are typically poor at discerning between
truthful and deceptive statements.We are generally inclined to believe in others and are more adept
at identifying truths as being non-deceptive than lies as being deceptive (Bond and DePaulo, 2006).
Indeed, Vrij (2008) placed the average person’s lie detection accuracy at about 55%, a level only
slightly above chance at 50%. Moreover, in a meta-analysis of 108 studies on deception detection,
Aamodt and Custer (2006) found that an individual’s deception detection ability could not be
predicted using any the following factors: conﬁdence, age, experience, education, and sex. Those
whose occupations dictate regular encounters with deception (e.g., police oﬃcers, detectives, and
judges) were also no better at detecting it compared to ordinary individuals. The implications of
these ﬁndings are worrying. Even though an inability to detect lies usually leads to relatively minor
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consequences in day-to-day, low-stake deceptions, repercussions
become much more severe in high-stake contexts such as law
enforcement, where individual and societal wellbeing are highly
dependent on the ability of law enforcers to form accurate
truthfulness judgments.
Hence, it should come as no surprise that much research
has been conducted with the aim of improving the deception
detection ability of laypeople and law enforcers alike. Research
has, for instance, analyzed cues to deception (e.g., Granhag
and Strömwall, 2002; DePaulo et al., 2003), investigated people’s
beliefs about deception (e.g., Zuckerman et al., 1981; Vrij and
Semin, 1996), and devised interview/interrogation methods that
facilitate deception detection (e.g., Vrij et al., 2006). The present
article explores another possibility, namely that unconscious
thought (UT) processes, as characterized in Dijksterhuis and
Nordgren’s (2006) Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT), might
facilitate improved detection of deception.
Several factors might contribute to people’s poor deception
detection performance. One factor is the limit on cognitive
processing capacity. Substantial cognitive resources are necessary
as deception detection typically requires integrating many partial
cues to deception (Vrij, 2008). Another reason is the reliance
on misleading cues when evaluating truthfulness as a result
of false beliefs about cue validities. Akehurst et al. (1996),
for example, found only a weak correlation between beliefs
about truthful/deceptive behavior and observations of actual
truthful/deceptive behavior. Participants believed that cues such
as faltering speech would decrease in frequency during deception
but they in fact increased. Gaze aversion, another cue that is
universally believed to be associated with deception (Global
Deception Research Team, 2006) was also not predictive of
actual deceptive behavior. As an individual’s false beliefs often
correlate highly with their truthfulness judgments (Bond et al.,
1985), it is unsurprising that humans are weak at detecting
deception. Although lie detection is typically poor, some cues are
objectively diagnostic of deception (DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer
and Schwandt, 2007). For example, truth tellers refer more often
to their mental status, and show fewer postural shifts and more
facial pleasantness.
All in all, these ﬁndings oﬀer a rather bleak outlook on people’s
ability to detect deception accurately. In an eﬀort to explore
solutions for this problem, the present research examines the
potential inﬂuences of processes outside conscious awareness on
thinking, perception, and behavior (see Bargh, 2011, for a review).
Unconscious Thought Theory: Background
and Critique
Based on ﬁndings from a series of decision making experiments,
Dijksterhuis (2004), Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006), and
Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) made the counterintuitive proposal that
in forming complex, multi-attribute decisions, engaging in UT
would lead to better choices compared to conscious thought
(CT). In the original procedure developed by Dijksterhuis and
colleagues to elicit what was coined the unconscious thought
eﬀect (UTE), participants were given the descriptions of four
choice options (e.g., cars) along with 12 feature attributes (e.g.,
mileage, service, legroom) for each. Each attribute had either a
positive or negative valence, and participants were required to
choose the best option which was deﬁned as the one that had the
most positive attributes. Participants were then assigned to one
of the three experimental conditions. In the UT condition, they
were instructed to complete some simple tasks for a brief period
of time, which meant that their attention was directed away
from the attributes and they were distracted from consciously
thinking about the options. In the CT condition, participants
were asked to think about the options for the same duration,
without being given the information about the valence of the
options. In the immediate decision (ID) condition, participants
made their decisions immediately after seeing all the attributes of
each option.
In a series of studies using similar methodologies, Dijksterhuis
et al. (2006) found that around 25% of the participants in the
CT condition chose the best option, whereas around 60% did
so in the UT condition. Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) also varied
whether the judgment task was simple or complex (i.e., multiple
relevant features to consider; alternatives varying on each of these
features).
Subsequently the UTE has been successfully replicated in
several studies. In Strick et al.’s (2011) meta-analysis, they found
an aggregate eﬀect size of g = 0.224 [95% CI: 0.145, 0.303] across
92 studies, a result which they interpreted as oﬀering strong
support for the UTE. On the other hand, considerable evidence
against the UTE has also been reported. For example, in a recent
large scale replication study (N = 399) by Nieuwenstein et al.
(2015), no signiﬁcant UTE was observed. In stark contrast to
Strick et al.’s (2011) ﬁndings, a meta-analysis of 61 UT studies
conducted by the same authors (employing a stricter set of
inclusion criteria) revealed that the published literature on the
UTE includes predominantly non-signiﬁcant eﬀects (N = 45).
Furthermore, studies which found a signiﬁcant UTE (N = 12)
typically had low sample sizes and were underpowered. The
meta-analytic eﬀect size was g = 0.018 [−0.10, 0.14], corrected
for the high degree of publication bias that was evident. Similarly,
Vadillo et al. (2015) found no overall UTE in a meta-analysis
focusing solely on studies conducted with medical experts.
Thus, the existence of the UTE remains heavily debated and
controversial.
The UTE is accounted for by Dijksterhuis and Nordgren’s
(2006) UTT. The UTT assumes that conscious but not UT
is limited by low cognitive processing capacity. Furthermore,
engaging in UT can yield a holistic judgment based on all the
attributes of an option, compared to CT which forms judgments
based on one or two speciﬁc attributes. Finally, the weighting
principle states that UT appropriately weighs each attribute
based on its relative importance while CT leads to suboptimal
weighting.
Despite questions surrounding the UTE’s existence and several
weaknesses in its formulation (e.g., González-Vallejo et al., 2008),
attempts to replicate the UTE in underexplored settings – such
as deception detection – remain worthwhile. Given that humans
encounter deception on a daily basis, the ﬁndings of such
replications will serve to strengthen the ecological validity of
evidence supporting or challenging the existence of the UTE.
More importantly, replications of the UTE in a deception
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detection setting would lend support to the hypothesis that
humans’ poor deception detection performance is speciﬁcally
caused by the constraints of CT. Indeed, based on the UTT, the
notion that UT can facilitate lie detection seems plausible as
characteristics assumed to be present in UT but absent in CT
might account for humans’ poor deception detection accuracy.
For example, it seems plausible that lie detection is achieved
better by an unconscious system that is able holistically to
integrate and optimally weight many partially predictive cues in
a bottom–up manner than by a conscious system which selects
and sub-optimally weights a small number of cues in a top–down,
expectancy- or schema-driven way.
Based on these ideas, Reinhard et al. (2013) devised ﬁve
experiments to test the hypothesis that lie detection by
participants in an UT condition would be signiﬁcantly more
accurate compared to CT and standard control conditions.
In their Experiment 1, participants watched video recordings
of persons recounting a real/false internship experience. Prior
to watching the videos, standard control participants learnt
of the possibility of deception while UT and CT participants
were merely instructed to form impressions. After watching
the videos, standard control participants immediately judged
each recording’s truthfulness while UT and CT participants
learnt of the possibility of deception. For the next 3 min, UT
participants completed a non-word search puzzle that served to
distract them from consciously thinking about the recordings,
while CT participants actively deliberated about each recording’s
truthfulness. Finally, both groups made truthfulness judgments.
Lie detection accuracy was found to be signiﬁcantly higher for UT
participants compared to CT and standard control participants.
The same trend was observed in Reinhard et al.’s (2013)
Experiments 2–4, which had similar procedures to Experiment
1 aside from minor variations in methodology, materials, and
conditions included. On the other hand, their Experiment 5
sought to analyze the diﬀerent cues which UT, CT, and standard
control participants relied upon when making truthfulness
judgments. They hypothesized that UT participants will rely on
more valid cues and integrate all cues in a less stereotypically
biased manner. Results conﬁrmed this hypothesis, as UT
participants were found to consider ﬁve cues when making
truthfulness judgments (i.e., postural shifts, facial pleasantness,
ﬁdgeting, vocal tension, and unﬁlled pauses), of which four were
objectively diagnostic of deception detection. In contrast, CT and
standard control participants relied on fewer cues (i.e., two each)
and none of those cues was diagnostic of a message’s truthfulness.
In summary, ﬁndings from all ﬁve experiments conducted by
Reinhard et al. (2013) provided strong support for the existence
of an UT advantage in deception detection.
As Reinhard et al.’s (2013) research was the ﬁrst (and to
date only) study to discover an UT advantage in a deception
detection context, the present study aims to replicate their basic
experimental paradigm (i.e., Experiment 1). In addition, the
present experiments sought to improve upon the procedure by
addressing an important methodological concern. Speciﬁcally,
the fact that standard control participants – but not those
in the UT or CT conditions – were informed about the
possibility of deception prior to watching the videos could have
inﬂuenced their lie detection performance. Hence, diﬀerences
in judgment accuracies between this condition and the UT
and CT conditions might not be attributable to the eﬀects of
diﬀerent thinking modes alone. Put diﬀerently, the performance
advantage obtained in the UT condition is weakened if one omits
ﬁndings from the standard control condition and focuses solely
on analyzing the pairwise comparison between the UT and CT
conditions. This is because the UT condition’s superiority over
the CT condition could be caused by CT impairing performance
rather than UT improving it (Shanks, 2006). This issue is resolved
in the current experiments by treating all three conditions
identically up to the deliberation stage. That is, we replace the
standard control with an ID condition where participants make
truthfulness judgments immediately after seeing the recordings
but do not possess foreknowledge of deception. It is hypothesized
that UT will still lead to more accurate lie detection compared to
the CT and ID conditions, while performance in the latter two
will not signiﬁcantly diﬀer.
The ﬁrst experiment constitutes an initial attempt to replicate
Reinhard et al.’s (2013) Experiment 1, using an improved method
as described above. Experiment 2 addresses an issue emerging




The eﬀect sizes observed by Reinhard et al. (2013) for the CT/UT
contrast varied between Cohen’s ds = 0.56 (Experiment 2) and
ds = 0.96 (Experiment 3), representing medium to large eﬀects.
In order to achieve power of 0.80, sample sizes of 34 per group
are required to detect an eﬀect midway between these extremes,
ds = 0.70. Therefore 116 participants (60 females) aged from 18
to 52 years old (M = 25.14, SD = 7.82) were included in the
experiment and randomly assigned to one of three conditions:
UT (N = 37), CT (N = 40), and ID (N = 39). Participants
were recruited from two sources: Proliﬁc Academic, an online
crowdsourcing platform (N = 89), and the University College
London (UCL) Psychology subject pool (N = 27). All participants
recruited from Proliﬁc Academic and 17 recruited from the UCL
Psychology subject pool were paid £3 for the 20 min study, while
the remaining subject pool participants received course credit for
their participation. All participants listed English as their ﬁrst
language, and provided their informed consent before testing
commenced.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The experimental survey was designed and run using Qualtrics
online survey software. The survey comprised an information
acquisition section, deliberation sections for UT and CT
participants, and a decision making section.
Experimental stimuli for the information acquisition section
consisted of videos of actors telling the truth or lying. Eight
individuals (four females) whose ﬁrst language was English
were recruited to pose as actors in these videos in exchange
for £3 payment. They were ﬁlmed with a digital video camera
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while recounting one true and one ﬁctitious vacation experience.
The ﬁlming of truthful responses always preceded deceptive
responses, so that actors could reﬂect upon elements of their
truthful response to help them generate their deceptive response
as convincingly as possible. Each actor was given 5min to prepare
their true and ﬁctitious stories based on three questions: (1)
When, where, and with whom did you go on this vacation?
(2) What exactly did you do on this vacation? (3) What did
you like/dislike about this vacation? Each of the resulting 16
recordings (M = 96.50 s, SD = 7.86 s) showed an actor sitting
against a plain wall with his/her face and upper body visible.
Average video length did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the
truthful (M = 94.50 s, SD = 8.96 s) and deceptive responses
(M = 98.50 s, SD = 6.55 s), t(14) = 1.02, p = 0.325. Two sets
of eight videos were created from the 16 recordings, such that
each actor appeared once in each set with a truthful or deceptive
response. Each set contained four truthful (two females) and four
deceptive (two females) responses. All videos were uploaded onto
YouTube before being embedded into the experimental survey.
A word search puzzle comprising a 20 × 20 matrix of letters was
used to distract UT participants during the deliberation phase.
Procedure
The experiment was introduced as “an experiment about
interpersonal impression formation.” Participants checked that
their computer’s video and audio capabilities were functioning
by watching a 5 s video excerpt. This video excerpt had identical
settings to the experimental videos, except that the actor was not
featured in any of those videos. Participants were also requested
to complete the experiment in a quiet environment with minimal
distractions.
Subsequently, participants entered the information
acquisition phase and were informed that they would be
watching eight videos consecutively. Each of these videos was
said to consist of an individual describing a past vacation of
theirs for ∼90 s. Participants were told to watch each video only
once and to repeat it only if they missed parts of it. Their task was
to form an impression of what was seen and heard in each video,
with no further information given at this point. Participants were
then randomly assigned to watch either set of eight videos, each
with a predetermined viewing order (see Supplementary Material
Appendix A1 for the order and truthfulness of each actor in each
set).
For each page, the video’s sequential position and its actor’s
ﬁctional name were displayed at the top (e.g., Video 1 of 8: Joe’s
Vacation). The video itself was displayed at the center of the page
with the dimensions 840 × 472 pixels. Each video was equipped
with an auto-play function that enabled it to play immediately
after the page was loaded. To ensure that participants watched
all the videos completely, all YouTube video controls, keyboard
controls, and display information were disabled except for the
pause function. Furthermore, participants were prevented from
navigating away from the page before each video ended as the
“proceed” button for each page was programmed to only appear
after the video ﬁnished playing.
After watching all eight videos, participants were informed
that some of the people they had watched were describing a
real vacation experience while others were describing a ﬁctitious
vacation. The number of actors who told the truth or lied was
not disclosed. Participants were then randomly assigned to the
UT, CT, or ID conditions. UT and CT participants underwent a
3 min deliberation phase, where the former were instructed to
work on a word search puzzle while the latter were told to actively
deliberate about the truthfulness of each actor’s statement. Before
commencing this phase, participants in both conditions were
informed that they would be making truthfulness judgments on
each actor’s statement in the decision making phase at the end of
the 3 min. Participants in the ID condition proceeded straight to
the decision making phase.
In the decision making test, participants were directed to a
page where photographs of all eight actors were listed vertically in
the order in which their videos had been presented. Participants
judged the truthfulness of each actor’s statement by clicking on
the “truth” or “lie” button beneath each actor’s picture. Upon
completion, participants were debriefed and thanked.
Results
Our data analyses are similar to those employed by Reinhard
et al. (2013). The hypothesis that participants would make
more accurate judgments in the UT than in the CT and ID
conditions was tested using signal detection theory. This theory
allows for the separation of two measures based on combined
information from two parameter estimates: d′ (d prime), which
in this study measures the ability of participants to make accurate
veracity judgments, and c (criterion), which measures the
general tendency for participants to make truthful or deceptive
judgments. Each participant’s discrimination ability (d′) was
calculated using the loglinear approach to correct hit and false
alarm rates to avoid having z-scores that were −∞ or +∞
(which results from hit and/or false alarm rates being 0 or 1,
respectively). The hit rate is deﬁned as the probability of truthful
judgments for truthful videos while the false alarm rate is deﬁned
as the probability of truthful judgments for deceptive videos. This
approach involves adding 0.5 to both the number of hits and
false alarms and adding 1 to the total number of trials before
calculating the hit and false alarm rates (Hautus, 1995).
Previous studies have speculated about potential gender
diﬀerences in the ability to detect deception (cf. Aamodt and
Custer, 2006). Moreover, several studies (see Nieuwenstein et al.,
2015) revealed that females were more likely to select the best
choice options in UTE experiments compared to males. Hence
gender is included in the data analysis. All statistical analyses
reported in this article were computed in JASP (Love et al., 2015),
and the data for this and the following experiment are available at
https://osf.io/3qm89.
Data from the two sets of videos were combined.
Subsequently, discrimination d′ was assessed using a 3 (thinking
mode) × 2 (gender) between subjects analysis of variance
(ANOVA). The main eﬀect of thinking mode was not signiﬁcant,
F(2,110) = 0.43, p = 0.649, η2p = 0.008. The pattern of numerical
means revealed that ID participants formed the most accurate
truthfulness judgments, M = −0.10, 95% CI [−0.35, 0.16],
followed by UT participants, M = −0.13 [−0.39, 0.13], and
CT participants, M = −0.26 [−0.50, −0.01]. Neither the main
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eﬀect of gender, F(1,110) = 0.10, p = 0.756, η2p = 0.001, nor
the interaction between gender and mode, F(2,110) = 0.35,
p = 0.708, η2p = 0.006, was signiﬁcant. Figure 1 illustrates
these ﬁndings. Across groups and genders, discrimination
was signiﬁcantly worse than chance, M = −0.16 [−0.30,
−0.02].
Response bias c was calculated for each condition. Negative
c values signify a bias toward judging videos as truthful while
positive values signify a bias toward judging them as deceptive.
The mean response bias across all conditions was signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero in the direction of truthful judgments,
M = −0.16 [−0.23, −0.09]. c was then subjected to the same
ANOVA as d′. The main eﬀect of thinking mode was found to
be signiﬁcant, F(2,110) = 5.74, p = 0.004, η2p = 0.094. The
main eﬀect of gender, F(1,110) = 0.77, p = 0.381, η2p = 0.007,
and the interaction eﬀect between thinking mode and gender,
F(2,110) = 0.71, p = 0.495, η2p = 0.013, were both non-
signiﬁcant. Collapsing across gender, ID participants were most
biased toward forming truthful judgments, M = −0.31 [−0.43,
−0.20], followed by UT participants, M = −0.16 [−0.28, −0.04],
and ﬁnally CT participants, M = −0.03 [−0.15, 0.08]. From
the conﬁdence intervals it can be seen that the response bias
of ID and CT participants diﬀered signiﬁcantly at p < 0.05,
while the response bias of UT participants fell somewhere in the
middle and did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from either the ID or CT
condition.
We also computed classiﬁcation accuracies (percent
correct), which are summarized in Table B1 (Supplementary
Material). Overall classiﬁcation accuracy was 46.6% [43.4, 49.7].
Classiﬁcation accuracy for truthful videos, M = 53.9% [49.6,
58.2], was not signiﬁcantly above chance while accuracy for
deceptive videos,M = 39.2% [35.0, 43.5], was signiﬁcantly below
chance.
To evaluate the possibility that UT might yield a lie detection
beneﬁt over CT for some speciﬁc actors, classiﬁcation accuracies
(percent correct) for each actor’s videos across conditions were
calculated. Table C1 (Supplementary Material) summarizes the
results. For example, of 19 participants who saw Kevin’s truthful
FIGURE 1 | Mean d′ of males and females in each condition of
Experiment 1 with +1/−1 SE bars.
video in the UT condition, 12 correctly judged it truthful (hits),
while of 18 (diﬀerent) participants who saw his deceptive video in
this condition, 10 judged it truthful (false alarms), for an overall
accuracy score of 54.1%.
The table reveals that three actors’ videos could be accurately
judged at better than chance (50%) level, and of these two
were judged more accurately in the UT than the CT condition.
However, even for the most extreme case (Kevin) with a 14.1%
UT > CT beneﬁt, the eﬀect was not signiﬁcant, χ2 = 1.53,
p = 0.217. Thus despite the variability across actors, these results
are largely in line with the overall results.
The ANOVA test on d′ failed to reveal any signiﬁcant
eﬀect of the diﬀerent thinking modes on lie detection accuracy.
However, null hypothesis testing does not permit any estimation
of the extent to which the data support this inference (i.e.,
the null hypothesis) as compared to the alternative hypothesis
that UT participants form more accurate truthfulness judgments
compared to CT and ID participants. Bayesian analysis is one
approach that allows the relative evidential support for the null
and alternative hypotheses to be determined (Rouder et al., 2009).
This approach involves the calculation of a Bayes factor BF01,
deﬁned as the ratio of the probability of the data given the null
hypothesis to the probability of the data given the alternative
hypothesis. A Bayes factor that is greater than 1 indicates that
belief should be adjusted in favor of the null hypothesis, while
a Bayes factor that is less than 1 indicates that belief should be
adjusted in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Comparisons of
d′ between the UT and CT conditions and between the UT and
ID conditions (using the Cauchy distribution, scale r on eﬀect
size = 1.0) yielded Bayes factors of 4.65 and 5.64, respectively,
providing substantial support for the null hypotheses that UT
does not increase lie detection in comparison to conscious
or immediate decisions.
Discussion
Experiment 1’s main objective was to replicate Reinhard et al.’s
(2013) ﬁnding that participants who engaged in unconscious
deliberation formed more accurate truthfulness judgments
compared to those in CT and standard control (or in this
experiment’s case, ID) conditions. However, the experiment
found no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in lie detection accuracies among
UT, CT, and ID participants. The numerical trend of d′ indicated
that participants in fact performed most accurately in the ID
condition, followed by the UT and ﬁnally CT conditions. This
contradicts the UTE pattern found by Reinhard et al. (2013)
and previous decision making studies. Computation of Bayes
factors also revealed that a rational observer who considers the
alternative hypothesis against the null hypothesis should, given
these results, adjust his/her belief in favor of the null hypothesis
by a factor of around 5. Indeed, Experiment 1’s results suggest
that there is no beneﬁt for any form of deliberation during lie
detection.
Analysis of participants’ overall classiﬁcation accuracy
revealed that they were able to discriminate between truthful
and deceptive videos, but were classifying them incorrectly.
Speciﬁcally, participants were discriminating the truthful videos
at chance level but were signiﬁcantly more likely to erroneously
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classify deceptive videos as truthful. One potential account
for this is that the actors were very convincing liars. As the
actors were encouraged to reﬂect on their performance in the
truthful videos to make their deceptive statements as believable
as possible, it is possible that they incorporated cues that are
typically associated with truthful responses into their deceptive
videos. Previous research (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer and
Schwandt, 2007) into the ways in which liars act diﬀerently from
truth-tellers revealed several cues to be objectively diagnostic
for deception detection. For instance, it was found that truth
tellers referred more often to their mental status, showed fewer
postural shifts and more facial pleasantness. Using postural shifts
as an example, it is possible that the actors incorporated fewer
postural shifts into their deceptive accounts than they would
otherwise have done in an eﬀort to be convincing. As a result
of this overcompensation, actors unknowingly enhanced the
(erroneous) credibility of their deceptive videos.
Experiment 2
Given that participants’ overall classiﬁcation accuracies in
Experiment 1 were signiﬁcantly below chance level, it could
be argued that the failure to replicate Reinhard et al.’s (2013)
ﬁnding was due to the presence of inappropriate cues in the
experimental videos that confounded the discrimination between
truthful and deceptive responses. Thus, Experiment 2 will once
again attempt to replicate the UT advantage found in Reinhard
et al.’s (2013) Experiment 1, but this time ensuring that relevant
cues are present in truthful and deceptive videos. Speciﬁcally,
cues that were found by Reinhard et al. (2013) to correlate
with UT participants’ truthfulness judgments (i.e., postural shifts,
facial pleasantness, ﬁdgeting, and length of unﬁlled pauses) were
explicitly incorporated into the experimental videos.
The rationale for incorporating these cues is twofold. Firstly,
given that three out of these four cues are objectively diagnostic
of lie detection, their incorporation should allow for the truthful
and deceptive videos to be objectively discriminated. If the
truthfulness judgments of participants across all conditions are
indeed facilitated, this would indicate that participants base
their judgments on cues available in the experimental videos.
Secondly, this creates a more conducive environment to elicit
the UTE, should it be present. If the lie detection accuracy of
UT participants was to be facilitated more compared to CT and
ID participants, this would lend support to Reinhard et al.’s




One hundred and ten participants (55 females) aged from 18
to 29 years old (M = 22.13, SD = 2.65) were recruited via
Proliﬁc Academic. None of the participants had taken part in
Experiment 1, and all were paid £3 for the 20 min study. They
were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: UT (N = 37),
CT (N = 40), and ID (N = 33). Similar to Experiment 1, all
participants listed English as their ﬁrst language, and provided
their informed consent before testing commenced.
Apparatus and Stimuli
Experiment 2 utilized similar apparatus and stimuli as
Experiment 1, aside from the videos used in the information
acquisition phase. Eight further individuals (four females) whose
ﬁrst language was English were recruited to pose as actors in
the new videos in exchange for £3 payment. The actors were
once again ﬁlmed with a digital video camera while recounting
a true and a ﬁctitious vacation experience. The ﬁlming order
of responses (i.e., truthful before deceptive) was identical to
Experiment 1, as were the timing and three questions provided
for the actors to prepare their stories. In addition, actors were
instructed to modulate the frequency of four out of the ﬁve
cues that were found by Reinhard et al. (2013) to correlate
with UT participants’ judgments of truthfulness: postural shifts,
facial pleasantness, ﬁdgeting, and unﬁlled pauses. Appendix D
(Supplementary Material) details the deﬁnitions of these cues as
extracted from DePaulo et al. (2003). The ﬁfth cue – less vocal
tension – was excluded as it was diﬃcult for actors to control.
Similarly, frequency (instead of duration) of unﬁlled pauses was
manipulated as the former was easier for actors to keep track
of. Thus, in truthful recordings, actors were instructed to show
more ﬁdgeting and facial pleasantness while avoiding frequent
postural shifts and silent pauses. In contrast, in deceptive
recordings, they were instructed to show more postural shifts
and silent pauses while avoiding ﬁdgeting or looking pleasant.
All recorded videos were compared with those from Experiment
1 to conﬁrm that the manipulated cues were displayed more/less
often.
Each of the resulting 16 recordings (M = 101.00 s, SD= 6.19 s)
showed an actor sitting against a plain wall with his/her face
and upper body visible. The average video length did not diﬀer
between the truthful (M = 98.25 s, SD = 5.09 s) and deceptive
responses (M = 103.75 s, SD = 6.23 s), t(14) = 1.93, p = 0.074,
and the average length did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between
Experiments 1 and 2, t(30) = 1.80, p = 0.082. Once again, two
sets of eight videos, each with four truthful (two females) and
four deceptive (two females) responses were created from the
16 recordings. Appendix A2 (Supplementary Material) lists the
order in both sets.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1.
Results
Data from participants who watched the diﬀerent sets of videos
were again combined under their respective thinking modes for
analysis. Each participant’s d′ was calculated using hit and false
alarm rates that were corrected using the loglinear approach.
Across groups and genders, and conﬁrming the success of
our manipulation of the video materials, discrimination was
signiﬁcantly better than chance, M = 0.28, 95% CI [0.09, 0.47],
Cohen’s ds = 0.28. Discriminability d′ was then subjected to
a 3 (thinking mode) × 2 (gender) between subjects ANOVA.
Similar to Experiment 1, the main eﬀect of thinking mode was
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not signiﬁcant, F(2,104) = 0.12, p = 0.887, η2p = 0.002. The
numerical pattern of means revealed that ID and UT participants
made the most accurate judgments, M = 0.31 [−0.03, 0.65] and
M = 0.31 [−0.02, 0.63], respectively, followed by CT participants,
M = 0.21 [−0.10, 0.53]. However, the main eﬀect of gender was
found to be signiﬁcant, F(1,104) = 5.02, p = 0.027, η2p = 0.045,
although it did not interact with thinking mode, F(2,104) = 0.86,
p= 0.427, η2p = 0.015. Speciﬁcally, females,M = 0.49 [0.22, 0.76],
formed more accurate judgments than males, M = 0.06 [−0.20,
0.33]. Figure 2 illustrates these results.
To investigate participants’ response bias, c was calculated
using corrected hit and false alarm rates. Like Experiment 1,
mean response bias across all conditions was found to be
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the direction of truthful
judgments, M = −0.18 [−0.23, −0.14]. c was then evaluated
using the same ANOVA as d′. The main eﬀect of thinking
mode was not signiﬁcant, F(2,104) = 0.08, p = 0.927, η2p
= 0.001. Similarly, the main eﬀect of gender, F(1,104) = 0.16,
p = 0.692, η2p = 0.001, and the gender × mode interaction,
F(2,104) = 1.79, p = 0.171, η2p = 0.033, were not
signiﬁcant.
Similar to Experiment 1, participants’ classiﬁcation accuracy
(percent correct) was calculated (Appendix B2, Supplementary
Material). Overall classiﬁcation accuracy, M = 55.8% [51.7,
59.9], improved compared to Experiment 1 and was signiﬁcantly
greater than chance (50%). Speciﬁcally, classiﬁcation accuracy
for truthful videos, M = 63.6% [59.4, 67.9], was signiﬁcantly
above chance while classiﬁcation accuracy for deceptive videos,
M = 48.0% [43.1, 52.8], was not.
The accuracy of classiﬁcation of each actor’s truthful and
deceptive videos was also examined using a similar method as in
Experiment 1 (see Table C2, SupplementaryMaterial). Consistent
with the overall improvement compared to Experiment 1, six
actors’ videos could be accurately judged at better than chance
(50%) level, but only two of these were judged more accurately
in the UT than the CT condition. Even for the most extreme case
FIGURE 2 | Mean d′ of males and females in each condition of
Experiment 2 with +1/−1 SE bars.
(James) with an 18.9% UT > CT beneﬁt, the diﬀerence was not
signiﬁcant, χ2 = 2.81, p = 0.094.
Once again, a Bayes factor analysis was conducted to estimate
the extent to which the data support the null hypothesis. The
Bayes factors (BF01) for comparisons of d′ between the UT and
CT conditions and between the UT and ID conditions were 5.25
and 5.50, respectively, again oﬀering substantial support for the
hypothesis that UT does not promote lie detection.
Discussion
Building on Experiment 1’s failure to replicate Reinhard et al.’s
(2013) ﬁndings, Experiment 2 sought to investigate whether UT
leads to enhanced lie-detection accuracy compared to CT and ID,
by improving the objective discriminability of the experimental
videos and creating an optimal environment to elicit the UTE.
However, truthfulness judgments among participants in the three
thinking modes still did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Indeed, results
from the Bayes factor analysis revealed that the experimental
data oﬀered strong support for the null hypothesis. The non-
signiﬁcant trend reﬂected the same pattern as Experiment 1, with
ID participants making the most accurate judgments and CT the
least. Hence, the present ﬁndings support the notion that the UTE
is not a robust phenomenon in deception detection, while also
echoing Experiment 1’s suggestion that there is minimal beneﬁt
of any form of deliberation in forming deception detection
judgments.
Contrary to the ﬁndings in Experiment 1, females were found
to make signiﬁcantly more accurate judgments compared to
males. One possible account for women’s superiority in this
experiment is that they were better than men at detecting the
manipulated cues. For instance, Hall (1978) provided some
evidence that women tend to be more adept at decoding
non-verbal cues than men, especially in visual-plus-auditory
situations. Even if this is the case, the present results suggest that
gender diﬀerences in sensitivity did not vary as a function of the
diﬀerent thinking modes.
Also in contrast to Experiment 1 is the ﬁnding that
participants were better at discriminating between truthful and
deceptive videos. This suggests that the experimental videos
employed in the current experiment (unlike those in Experiment
1) incorporated appropriate discriminating cues. Indeed the
overall accuracy level (55.8%) is very close to that obtained by
Reinhard et al. (2013, Experiment 1), 54.7%. Hence the diﬀerence
in outcome cannot be attributed to any overall diﬀerence in
task diﬃculty (and of course the signiﬁcant gender eﬀect shows
that our study was sensitive to at least one factor). Finally,
the degree of response bias displayed by participants was not
found to signiﬁcantly diﬀer as a function of thinking mode. This
is consistent with Reinhard et al.’s (2013) ﬁndings and lends
support to the suggestion that the signiﬁcant diﬀerence found in
Experiment 1 was an anomaly.
Note that in both experiments there is some tendency for
males to make more accurate judgments in the UT than
the CT condition, but even this post hoc comparison is not
signiﬁcant. Combining the data from male participants across
both experiments, d′ did not diﬀer, t(76) = 1.09, p = 0.28, and
the null hypothesis is supported, BF01 = 3.64.
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General Discussion
The main aim of this research was to verify whether a
UTE exists in the lie detection domain. Speciﬁcally, it was
hypothesized that engaging in UT would lead to better lie-
detection accuracy compared to CT and immediate choice.
However, both experiments failed to observe any signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in lie detection accuracy across the three thinking
modes. On the contrary, Bayes factor analyses found substantial
support in favor of the null hypothesis that the diﬀerent thinking
modes do not lead to diﬀerences in lie detection accuracy.
Despite largely adhering to the procedure of Reinhard et al.’s
(2013) studies, the present experiments failed to replicate their
ﬁnding that unconscious processing leads to superior deception
detection performance. One could argue that the discrepant
results in Experiment 1 were due to the presence of confounding
cues in the experimental videos, which did not allow for accurate
truth/deception discrimination. However, Experiment 2 still did
not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant advantage for engaging in UT, in spite of
the fact that the truthful and deceptive videos in this experiment
were objectively discriminable. This ﬁnding is especially notable
given that the cues incorporated into the videos in Experiment
2 were explicitly intended to facilitate the occurrence of a
UTE.
Statistical power is unlikely to be a contributing factor in
these failed replications, as a power analysis suggested that our
sample sizes (116 and 110 in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively)
were adequate to detect the eﬀect obtained by Reinhard et al.
(2013), and their Experiment 1 included substantially fewer
participants (66). Note also that the Bayesian analyses, which
yielded substantial support for the null hypothesis, implicitly take
sample size into account.
Accounting for the Replication Failure
The present ﬁndings could be the result of two alternative
possibilities: either the UTE found by Reinhard et al. (2013) was
a false positive, or engaging in UT truly leads to enhanced lie
detection accuracy compared to CT and immediate choice, but
minor methodological diﬀerences between the present study and
Reinhard et al.’s (2013) prevented detection of the eﬀect. We
consider four such diﬀerences.
First, the length of the video stimuli used across both
experiments in the current study (M = 99 s) was appreciably
shorter than those used in Reinhard et al.’s (2013) Experiment 1
(M = 228 s). The rationale behind using shorter videos stemmed
from a reluctance to have participants watch videos consecutively
for more than half an hour (228 s × 8 videos = 1824 s), which
could have induced boredom and inattention. Is it likely that
this shorter presentation time could have in some way hampered
the occurrence of a UTE? Strick et al.’s (2011) meta-analysis
revealed that the UTE tended to be larger when information
presentation times were shorter. If anything, a shorter video
length should therefore have facilitated the UTE. Moreover in
their Experiments 2 and 4 Reinhard et al. (2013) themselves used
much shorter videos (30 s) and still obtained UTEs. Nevertheless
shorter videos obviously contain fewer cues on which to form a
truthfulness judgment.
Secondly, several diﬀerences exist between the videos utilized
in the present experiments and those used in Reinhard et al.’s
(2013) Experiment 1. Reinhard et al.’s (2013) experiment was
conducted in German while the present experiments were
conducted in English. Actors in Reinhard et al.’s (2013) videos
spoke about an internship experience in a realistic setting
(i.e., they were dressed in business attire and ﬁlmed in a
room that looked appropriate for an employment interview),
while actors in the present experiments spoke about a vacation
experience in a neutral setting (i.e., they were dressed normally
and were ﬁlmed against a blank wall). In addition, all eight
actors in Reinhard et al. (2013) were males while the present
experiments used an even mix of male and female actors. These
diﬀerences could potentially contribute to the failed replication.
If we look at lie detection performance separately for the
eight male and eight female actors in the present experiments
(data in Tables C1 and C2, Supplementary Material), overall
detection accuracy is in fact slightly higher for the females.
For male actors in Experiment 2, d′ is somewhat higher in
the UT (M = 0.13) compared to the CT (M = −0.10) and
I (M = 0.09) conditions but these diﬀerences are far from
signiﬁcant (p > 0.3 in both cases). Nevertheless, actor gender
should certainly be borne in mind as a potential moderator in
future research.
Thirdly, in contrast to Reinhard et al.’s (2013) laboratory
based experiments, both experiments in this study were
conducted entirely online. The fact that online subjects
participate in experiments under self-supervised conditions
raises some potential questions about the reliability of the
data obtained compared to laboratory based experiments,
and the level of engagement of participants throughout the
experiment. But a growing literature demonstrates rather similar
data patterns in a broad range of laboratory and online
experiments, including ones evaluating decision making (e.g.,
Paolacci et al., 2010; Germine et al., 2012; Klein et al.,
2014). This is certainly something to be explored further in
future research, but the available evidence provides no strong
support for this being an important moderating factor. One
of the clear advantages of online experiments is that direct
human interaction between researcher and participant is limited
thus leaving less room for experimenters to bias participants’
responses.
Finally, the task used to distract UT participants during the
deliberation phase in the current study was slightly diﬀerent from
Reinhard et al.’s (2013). Speciﬁcally, Reinhard et al. (2013) had
UT participants complete a 15 × 15 non-word search puzzle,
with an undisclosed number of non-words to be found. The
distraction task used in the present experiments was a 20 × 20
word search puzzle, with 18 words to be found. Although usage
of diﬀerent forms of word search puzzle seems like a trivial
methodological detail, Strick et al. (2011) did ﬁnd that the UTE
tended to be larger in studies using word search puzzles (as
opposed to anagrams or n-back tasks) as a distraction task.
Given that the nature of a distraction task could lead to diﬀerent
outcomes, it is possible that engaging in aword search puzzle with
a diﬀerent format could lead to a failure in replicating the UTE as
well.
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Note of course that even if the UT > CT eﬀect observed by
Reinhard et al. (2013) is reproducible, they provided no evidence
that it demonstrates a beneﬁt of UT: equally possible is that
it results from a detriment of CT (Shanks, 2006). Without an
appropriate ID control condition, these possibilities cannot be
distinguished. The experiments reported here included just such
a control condition, and no hint of a beneﬁt of UT was observed.
Implications and Limitations
Instead of endorsing Reinhard et al.’s (2013) proposed solution
to improve humans’ poor deception detection performance,
the present ﬁndings aﬃrm the pessimistic outlook oﬀered
by previous deception detection studies on people’s ability to
distinguish truths from lies (e.g., Vrij, 2008), and contribute to
existing literature that argues against the existence of a UTE (e.g.,
Nieuwenstein et al., 2015). While the current results do not speak
to potential improvements in deception detection accuracy using
other methodologies, they cast some doubt on the notion that
deception detection accuracy can be signiﬁcantly facilitated by
engaging in UT. Indeed, the fact that ID participants consistently
performed best and CT worst (albeit non-signiﬁcantly) in both of
our experiments suggests that there is no beneﬁt of any form of
deliberation when it comes to lie detection.
Whatever the conclusions about UT, it is interesting that
conscious, deliberate thought provides such little beneﬁt over
immediate thought in the conditions tested here and elsewhere.
A possible explanation is that the UTE procedure places excessive
burdens on working memory as participants try to retain a
considerable amount of highly confusable information prior to
making their judgments. Another possibility is that participants
treat the task as an online judgment problem, forming their
beliefs while observing the videos, rather than subsequently.
Newell and Shanks (2014) review several accounts of why CT
yields such little beneﬁt in UTE experiments.
One limitation of the present studies is the lack of
speciﬁc assessment of the cues on which participants based
their judgments. Future research should measure self-reported
strategies, and also present speciﬁc probe items. For example,
participants could be shown ‘thin slices’ of behavior in which a
single cue is manipulated.
Evidence from other experimental methods is similarly
inconclusive about the role of unconscious processes in lie
detection. For instance, Albrechtsen et al. (2009) reported better
deception detection when participants viewed ‘thin-sliced’ 15 s
versions of true and false confessions than longer 3 min versions,
and also detected deception better in the longer videos when
they viewed them concurrently with performing a secondary
n-back task. But as with the UT> CT eﬀect in UTE experiments,
these ﬁndings do not distinguish between a beneﬁt of UT and
a detriment of CT. In another example, ten Brinke et al. (2014)
presented participants with videos of actors either telling the
truth or lying about a theft. Discrimination was at chance
under explicit (conscious) conditions similar to those of the
present ID condition. In contrast, during implicit (unconscious)
tests, participants responded signiﬁcantly diﬀerently to images of
truthful and deceptive actors. ten Brinke et al.’s (2014) rationale
was to suppress conscious processing and hence permit the
capacity-unlimited, optimal-weighting unconscious to operate
eﬀectively. In light of their results they concluded that deceptive
cues from the actors can be detected and “leak” into unconscious
but not conscious decisions. But as pointed out by Levine
and Bond (2014), the chance-level discrimination ten Brinke
et al. (2014) observed under explicit conditions is anomalous:
although lie detection is often poor, meta-analyses (as noted in
the Introduction) show that it yields an eﬀect size estimate of
around d= 0.4, which is greater than the implicit eﬀects observed
by ten Brinke et al. (2014). As with the UTE, more research with
these methods is needed before ﬁrm conclusions can be drawn.
In light of these considerations and the results obtained in our
experiments, Reinhard et al.’s (2013) suggestion to incorporate
unconscious processes into police training manuals on deception
detection seems premature. Furthermore, their claim that “the
human mind is not unﬁt to distinguish between truth and
deception but this ability resides in previously overlooked
processes” (Reinhard et al., 2013, p. 721) appears too simplistic.
More in-depth research into these questions as well as further
replications of the UTE in the deception detection context is
clearly needed. In the meantime, instead of manipulating one’s
thinking mode in the hope of improving lie detection, it is
perhaps wise to stick to methods that have been shown in many
studies to be eﬀective in facilitating deception detection (Vrij,
2008).
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